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STATES OF AMERICA, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 14514 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Sixth 
Judidial District Court as to the priorities of certain 
judgment creditors on a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court awarded Judgment on a Decree of 
Foreclosure to the judgment creditors, Bank of Ephraim, 
Babylon Corporation, Prudential Federal Savings and Loan 
Association and the Utah State Tax Commission as per the 
Complaints of each creditor. The rights of the defendant 
Steinmann were previously assigned to defendant Babylon 
Corporation. The defendants First State Bank and United 
States of America were previously dismissed as parties 
defendant to the action. 
In its judgment and decree of foreclosure the 
District Court in addition to awarding Judgments to the 
judgment creditors, assigned priorities to the judgments 
of each creditor, as is set forth in the Statement of Facts. 
It is from these priorities that the plaintiff appellant 
appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the Supreme Court declare 
that the trial court was in error in granting the defendants 
Babylon Corporation and Prudential Federal Savings priorities 
on their judgments ahead of the entire judgment of the plain-
tiff, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There are generally no controversies concerning the 
facts of the case which are basically as follows: 
The case involves three parcels of property des-
cribed below: 
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PARCEL 1 
Beginning at a point 1.94 chains North from the 
Southwest corner of Block 57 as platted in Plat 
"A" Manti City Survey, thence East 4.20 chains, 
thence North 33° West, along Manti City Creek, 
1.10 chains, thence West 3,55 chains, thence 
South 1.00 chain to the place of beginning. 
PARCEL 2 
Beginning at a point 234.96 feet South, thence 
129 feet East from the Northwest corner of Block 
57, as platted in Plat "A" Manti City Survey, 
thence North 48° East 14 feet, thence North 40.25 
feet, thence East 66 feet, thence South 49.50 feet, 
thence West 7 6.33 feet to beginning. 0.465 acres. 
PARCEL 3 
All of Lot 9, Block 44, Plat "A", Manti City Survey, 
Sanpete County, State of Utah, containing 0.60 acre, 
more or less 
Parcels 1 and 2 have a cafe known as Hals Palace 
Cafe, as an improvement and shall be hereafter referred to 
as the cafe property. 
Parcel 3 is a trailer court and shall hereafter be 
referred to as the trailer property. 
CAFE PROPERTY: 
On the 7th day of August, 1970 the defendant, Halbert 
Davis mortgaged to the Bank of Ephraim the Cafe Property and 
signed a note at the time for the sum of $2,400.00. 
On the face of the mortgage is typed a clause which reads: 
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"This mortgage covers all additional advances 
on this loan, the total principal amount not to exceed 
$3,000.00." 
Paragraph 2 of the printed portion of the mortgage 
reads: 
"To secure payment of any and all extensions or 
renewals and successive extensions or renewals, of the note 
above described, or of the indebtedness represented by the 
same, and of any other indebtedness at any time existing 
from the mortgagor to the mortgagee, whether represented by 
notes, drafts, open account or otherwise, and all the inter-
est on all of the same, all of which extensions or renewals 
shall be optional with the mortgagee, but at the mortgageef s 
option may be made by new notes or otherwise and at, before, 
or after maturity, and for all of which this mortgage shall 
stand as a continuing security until paid." 
On August 7, 1970 the defendant Halbert Davis gave 
a second mortgage to Steven Kaye Steinmann and signed a 
Promissory Note in favor of Steven Kaye Steinmann in the sum 
of $14,500.00. Both the note and the mortgage were subsequen 
ly assigned to the defendant Babylon Corporation. 
The mortgage to Steven Kaye Steinmann expressly set 
forth the fact that it was secondary to the mortgage to the 
Bank of Ephraim. 
On June 6, 1972 the defendant Halbert Davis executed 
a Promissory Note to the Bank of Ephraim in the sum of 
$35,555.89. 
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On June 21, 1972 defendant Davis execut ed an 
installment note and mortgage to Prudential Federal Savings 
& Loan Association in the sum of $4,073,40, This amount 
was later absorbed in the subsequent installment note and 
mortgage of October 19, 1972 in the sum of $10,228.80. 
On April 5, 1973 the defendant Halbert Davis executed 
a Promissory NOte to the Bank of Ephraim in the sum of 
$2,000.00 and on June 19, 1974 Davis executed a Promissory 
Note to Bank of Ephraim in the sum of $5,384.00. 
Further, on March 19, 1974 defendant Davis delivered 
to Plaintiff, Bank of Ephraim, its note in the sum of $5,500.00 
which is set forth in the Plaintiff's Third Claim for Relief. 
The interest of the Utah State Tax Commission is 
represented by delinquent tax warrants for delinquent sales, 
unemployment and Income Tax. 
At the time of the trial on January 5, 1976 all the 
parties presented evidence which the court took under advise-
ment and later awarded judgment as follows: 
(a) To the Bank of Ephraim, $43,037.00 Principal, 
$6,536.75 interest and $3,000.00 attorney's fees 
for a total judgment of $52,573.75, and Decree of 
Foreclosure on the cafe property. 
(b) To the Babylon Corporation, $13,269.52 principal, 
$1,126.00 interest, $40.00 title report, $2,000.00 
Attorney's fee for a total judgment of $16,435.52 and 
a Decree of Foreclosure on the Cafe property. 
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(c}_ To Prudential Federal Savings, $5,833.33 principal, 
$25.00 title report, $900,00 attorney's fees for a total 
Judgment of $6,750.33 and a Decree of Foreclosure on the 
Cafe property. 
(d) To the Utah State Tax Commission, $2,76 6.73. 
(e) To the Bank of Ephraim on its Third Cause of Action, 
$5,500.00 principal, $900.00 attorney's fees and $996.11 
interest for a total Judgment of $7,396.11 and a Decree of 
Foreclosure on the Cafe property. 
The court then assigned the following priorities on the 
Cafe Property: 
(1) Bank of Ephraim 
Plus interest at 10% per annum from 
2/22/74 $3,000.00 
Plus reasonable attorney's fee of 600.00 
Plus costs of Court in the sum of 27.10 
(2) Babylon Corporation 14,395.52 
Plus reasonable attorney fees of 2,000.00 
Plus interest at 8% per annum from 
date 
(3) Prudential Federal Savings and Loan 
Associacion 5,833.37 
Plus interest at 10% per annum 
Plus Sttomey's fees 900.00 
(4) Balance of Judgments to Bank of Ephraim 
including amounts found due on its 
Third Cause of Action 
(5) State of Utah Tax Warrants 2,766.73 
TRAILER COURT PROPERTY: 
On March 15, 1971 defendant, Davis, executed a 
Promissory Note in the amount of $4,000.00 in favor of the 
Bank of Ephraim, which was secured by a mortgage on the 
trailer park property. 
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On the fact of this mortgage is typed a clause which reads: 
"This mortgage covers all additional advances on 
this loan, the total principal amount not to exceed $6,000,00." 
Paragraph 2 of the printed portion of the mortgage reads: 
"To secure payment of any and all extensions or 
renewals, and successive extensions or renewals, of the 
note above described, or of the indebtedness represented 
by the same, and of any other indebtedness, at any time aris-
ing from the mortgagor to the mortgagee, whether represented 
by notes, drafts, open account or otherwise, and all the 
interest on all of the same, all of which extensions or re-
newals shall be optional with the mortgagee, but at the 
mortgagee's option may be made by new notes or otherwise 
and at, before, or after maturity, and for all of which the 
mortgage shall stand as a continuing security until paid." 
On June 21, 1972, defendant Davis obtained a loan 
from Prudential Federal which was superceded by its subse-
quent loan on October 16, 1972. This loan is the same as 
the loan covered by the Cafe property above, Prudential's 
mortgage covering both parcels of property. 
Thereafter, on July 31, 1974 by an additional 
Promissory Note, Halbert Davis borrowed an additional 
$1,508.41 on the trailer court property from the Plaintiff. 
The interest of the Utah State Tax Commission is the 
same as on the cafe property. 
The defendant Babylon Corporation is not an interesed 
party in the trailer court property. 
The evidence on the trailer court was submitted to 
the court as was done on the Cafe property and the court 
awarded judgment as follows: 
- 7 -
(a) To the Bank of Ephraim, $5,508,41 principal, 
$941.48 interest, $750.00 attorney's fee for a total 
judgment of $7,229.89, and a Decree of Foreclosure 
on the trailer property. 
(b) To Prudential Federal Savings the same judgment 
as given on the Cafe property. 
(c) To Utah State Tax Commission - same judgment 
as on Cafe property. 
The court then assigned the following priorities on 
trailer property: 
(1) Bank of Ephraim $5,508.41 
Plus interest of 971.48 
Plus reasonable attorney fee of 750.00 
and interest at rate of 8% from date 
of Judgment until paid 
(2) Prudential Federal Savings 
Same as in Cafe property. 
(3) Bank of Ephraim 
Balance of indebtedness owned on 
all obligations 
(4) Utah Stat^ Tax Commission 
Same as in Cafe property 
It is from the decision of the Court assigning the 
priorities as to the Cafe property from which the plaintiff 
takes this appeal. Plaintiff does not contest the priorities 
of the court as they apply to the trailer property. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: TEE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PARAGRAPH 2(a) 
OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT IN AWARDING THE JUDGMENTS OF 
DEFENDANT BABYLON CORPORATION AND PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS 
PRIORITY OVER THE BALANCE OF THE INDEBTEDNESS TO THE BANK 
OF EPHRAIM. 
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The Plaintiff's position as supported by the 
authorities cited below is that all the promissory notes 
and mortgage by which the notes are secured are a first 
priority over all other lien claims. 
The plaintiff admits at the beginning that the 
advances made by the Bank of Ephraim were optional and 
not obligatory under the mortgage. 
The contention of the Defendant Prudential Federal 
Savings at the time of trial was that since the advances 
made by the bank were optional, that the lien priority is 
determined as of the time the advances were actually made, 
and that in no event should the lien priority exceed $3,000.00 
as set forth on the face of the mortgage. 
The problem with this is that the bulk of the ad-
vances made by the Bank of Ephraim on the Cafe property 
were prior to the time Prudential Federal Savings made its 
loan. This is obviously why Prudential urges the $3,000.00 
limitation. 
To adopt this position, however, one has to take the 
position that we should hold to one clause of the mortgage 
and not to another. Paragraph 2 of the mortgage plainly 
includes all other loans of whatever nature. 
The defendant Prudential and all other claimants 
had notice of that clause, for it was on file and they only 
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had to inquire of the Bank of Ephraim as to any amounts 
loaned under the mortgage before they extended any money 
themselves. 
Moreover, the finding of the court in regard to 
priorities is a little conflicting* The court holds the 
Bank of Ephraim has a valid mortgage against the defendant 
Davis for the full amount of the monies loaned, but says 
that the priorities extend to only $3,000.00. If Paragraph 
2 of the mortgage is binding upon the defendant Davis, why 
isn't it binding on the other parties defendant? Plaintiff's 
contention is that its priority is not limited by the 
$3,000.00 figure in the mortgage and that it should be given 
priority at a minimum for the advances made before interven-
ing encumbrances were made. Plaintiff further contends that 
Paragraph 2 of the mortgage is sufficient to give it prioiity 
over all lien holders. 
A number of cases in various jurisdictions have dealt 
with the above situation and while some of these cases have 
held that advances made on a first mortgage after a second 
mortgage are secondary to the second mortgage in terms of 
priority, it is likewise true that a number of cases have hel 
a mortgage of property given in good faith to secure future 
advances is not regarded as invalid as against the holder 
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of intervening subsequent interests, Kentucky Lumber 
& Mill Co. v. Kentucky Title Sav. Bank and T, Co,, 184 
Ky 244, 211 S W 765; Batten v. Jurist; 306 Pa. 64, 158 A 557. 
The generally prevailing doctrine seems to be that 
advances made under a recorded mortgage given to secure 
further optional advances will not be denied priority in lien 
merely because the intervening encumbrancer could not have 
determined from the mortgage, without extraneous inquiry, 
the true amount of the indebtedness of advances secured 
thereby. Hurst v. Flynn-Harris-Ballard Co. 143 SE 503; 
Exerist v. Carter 202 Iowa 498, 210 NW 559; Merchants 
State Bank v. Tufts 14 ND 238, 103 NW 760; Lawn Sprinkle 
Merc. Co. v. Hause Tex Civ App 184 SW 737. 
The case before the bar is very similar to the above 
in that Prudential Federal Savings could have determined the 
amount of indebtedness on the Bank of Ephraim mortgage by a 
simple inquiry of the Bank. 
Although there is contrary authority, the rule laid 
down in most cases is that an advance, though purely optional, 
made pursuant to a mortgage of which subsequent parties had 
record or other sufficient notice, is a lien or charge sup-
erior to an encumbrance intervening between the giving of 
the mortgage and the making of the advance, if the mortgagee 
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had no knowledge and no actual notice of the intervening 
encumbrance. Savings & Loan Soc. v. Burnett, 106 Cal.514 
30 P. 922, Schmidt v. Zahrndt 148 Ind. 447f 47 NE 335, 
Passaic Nat Bank & Trust Co.v. Owens., Ill N J Eq 486 162 
A 879, Hall v. Williamson Aro. Co. 69 W Va 671, 72 SE 780. 
While the Bank of Ephraim may have had constructive 
notice by reason of the recording of the Prudential mortgage, 
they had no actual notice and in fact, the lionshare of the 
advances made by the plaintiff Bank were prior in time to 
those of Prudential Federal Savings. 
Even if the Plaintiff had had actual notice of the 
Second Mortgage, there is authority to support the propos-
ition that the lien of an advance made under a mortgage to 
secure optional future advances (of which mortgage subsequent 
persons had record or other sufficient notice; takes priority 
over an encumbrance intervening between the giving of the 
mortgage and the making of the advance, even though the 
mortgagee had actual notice or knowledge of the intervening 
encumbrance. Gray v. Helm 60 Miss 131, Wibczinski v. 
Everman, 51 Miss 841; First Nat. Bank v. Zarafonetis (Tex Civ 
App) 15 SW 2d 155. 
The general rule would seem to be that before a 
holder of a mortgage to secure future advances can be de-
prived of his superior equity on the ground of notice of an 
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intervening interest, actual notice thereof must be brought 
to his attention. Farmers Union Warehouse Co, v. Barnett 
Bros. 273 Ala 435, 137 So. 176, Topia v. Demartini 77 Cal 
383, 19 P 641; Corn Belt Trust & Sav. Bank vs.May. 197 Iowa 
54, 196 NW 735. 
No where in the record is there any evidence that 
the plaintiff had any actual notice of the mortgage to 
Prudential Federal Savings. 
It is further of interest that the Utah Supereme 
Court seems never to have squarely come to grips with this 
question. Utah Savings and Loan Association v. Mecham 11 
U 2d 159, 356 P 2d 281 seems to uphold the position of Pru-
dential Federal Savings on first reading, but a more careful 
reading shows two things, 
1. That the actual holding of the court was to 
remand the case back to the District Court for more definite 
findings and thus any statement made as to priority of liens 
is dicta. 
2. That the case actually involved the question of 
priority of liens of a mortgage and subsequent liens on 
material men under our mechanics lien statute. 
Thus the Utah Courts have never actually determined 
the question of priority and the only case may be clearly 
seen as not being in point. 
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As a matter of fact, nearly all the cases which 
hold for the position of Prudential Federal Savings have 
dealt with priority as it exists between the mortgagee 
and intervening materials men. 
There are some very good reasons to distinguish the 
materials men cases from the case at hand, one being the 
fact that in a materialsmen case the mortgagee making the 
subsequent advances has every reason to know or believe t].at 
the money he advances will be used to make improvements which 
immediately raises the probability of a materialsmen lien. 
This is not the case with a second mortgagee. 
The Steinmann or Babylon morrgage is no different 
than the Prudential Mortgage except that the advances by 
the Bank were all made after the giving of the Steinmann 
mortgage by the defendant Davis. 
It is evidently clear that Steinmann knew of the 
mortgage to Bank of Ephraim as she expressly made her mortgag 
secondary to the mortgage of the Bank of Ephraim, She not 
only had construction notice by actual notice of the mortgage 
but was aware of the Provisions of Paragraph 2 of the mortgag 
She further knew that the defendant Davis was palnnin 
to make a cafe out of the property, and that the Plaintiff 
would be advancing large sums of money to the defendant Davis 
for the needed improvement of the property. 
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CONCLUSION 
The contention of the Plaintiff Bank of Ephraim 
is that Paragraph 2 of its mortgage does not place dollar 
limitations on it which limits its priority, that there is 
further clear authority to support the priority of its 
advances over any intervening liens and that on the basis 
of the notice and our statutes, this court should grant 
priority to the plaintiffs over all the lien claimants 
and remand the case back for Findings of Fact consistent 
therewith. 
le^pectfully submitted, 
MDUIS G./TERVORT 
/^RISCHpffiCHT & TERVORT 
Attorneys for th£ 
Plaintiff-Appellants 
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